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Enhancing “theory of mind” through
behavioral synchrony
Adam Baimel*, Rachel L. Severson, Andrew S. Baron and Susan A. J. Birch
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
Theory of mind refers to the abilities underlying the capacity to reason about one’s own
and others’ mental states. This ability is critical for predicting and making sense of the
actions of others, is essential for efficient communication, fosters social learning, and
provides the foundation for empathic concern. Clearly, there is incredible value in fostering
theory of mind. Unfortunately, despite being the focus of a wealth of research over the last
40 years relatively little is known about specific strategies for fostering social perspective
taking abilities. We provide a discussion of the rationale for applying one specific strategy
for fostering efficient theory of mind—that of engaging in “behavioral synchrony” (i.e., the
act of keeping together in time with others). Culturally evolved collective rituals involving
synchronous actions have long been held to act as social glue. Specifically, here we
present how behavioral synchrony tunes our minds for reasoning about other minds in
the process of fostering social coordination and cooperation, and propose that we can
apply behavioral synchrony as a tool for enhancing theory of mind.
Keywords: theory of mind, social perspective taking, behavioral synchrony, ritual, interventions
Introduction
Philosophers have long debated the means by which we can, with any certainty, know of the mental
worlds of others. This problem of otherminds—that is how it is we think we know what other people
know, feel and think—is not one that we can easily solve with logic alone (Dennett, 1981). However,
throughout our evolution, humans have been endowed with the sufficient cognitive architecture
that allows for us to, at the very least reason about the minds of others—our “theory of mind”
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen, 1999). This capacity for
understanding others’ behaviors in terms of underlying mental states allows us to be empathic
(Schnell et al., 2011), makes us adept cultural learners (Herrmann et al., 2007; Chudek and Henrich,
2011), and is involved in our moral reasoning (Moran et al., 2011; Young et al., 2011), our ability to
coordinate and cooperate (Sally andHill, 2006), as well as our ability to compete with, ormanipulate,
other individuals (Ybarra et al., 2007, 2010; Sher et al., 2014). Although this list is far from exhaustive,
it should be clear that being an efficient mindreader facilitates successful navigation of the many
challenges humans face in their socio-cultural environments. Indeed, those who are sometimes
described as “mindblind”—individuals diagnosed along the autism spectrum—often experience
tremendous hardships in everyday social interactions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
Notably, being able to reason about other minds does not necessarily equate to being accurate
at mindreading. Specifically, our reasoning about other minds is often inaccurate in one of two
ways. For instance, when thinking about others’ minds could be most informative, such as when
taking directions, we often fail to do so all together (Keysar et al., 2003; Samson and Apperly, 2010).
Further, it is (extremely) common for individuals to think about and ascribe minds to entities
when there is little to no evidence of a mind (at least not in the typical sense). For example,
people frequently think about their computers as intentional beings with “minds of their own,” and
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people the world over ascribe mental states such as knowledge
and intentions to bodiless spirits, ghosts, and gods (Waytz et al.,
2010b). This set of inaccuracies represents systematic errors in
mind perception and attribution—both true-misses and false
positives. Moreover, our reasoning about the content of others’
minds is often inaccurate and systematically biased by our own
perspectives and knowledge (Birch, 2005; Bernstein et al., 2011).
This egocentrism prevents accurate attribution of, and subsequent
reasoning about, the contents of other minds.
The mismatch between the human propensity for reasoning
about other minds and our noted deficits in accurately doing
so emerges from the imperfections of our evolved capacities,
and the lengthy process of their development across the lifespan
(Gehlbach, 2004; Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). This gives rise
to substantial individual variability in some domains of theory
of mind such as emotion recognition and empathic tendencies
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen andWheelwright, 2004),
while strikingly less so in others, such as reasoning about false
beliefs (Liu et al., 2008). As such, what we refer to more
generally as “theory of mind” is but a placeholder for a suite
of related systems that function at different levels of cognitive
processing. Implicit, automatic and inflexible systems for agency
detection, face recognition, gaze following, emotion processing,
joint attention, and our naïve theories of causality motivate a
reflexive understanding of others’ behavior as resulting from
underlying mental states (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). This
reflexive reasoning is elaborated with explicit, verbal and flexible
thought (Epley and Caruso, 2008), only when we have the
cognitive resources and motivation to do so (Rhodes, 2014).
As such, any account of how to foster theory of mind must
take into consideration the various interconnected systems at play
when people reason about the minds of others (Harwood and
Farrar, 2010; Schaafsma et al., 2015). By understanding the parts
of the process, we can begin to examine how to grease those
gears and enhance our theory of mind capabilities. With such a
framework in mind, we present behavioral synchrony, the act of
keeping together in timewith others, as a novel tool for honing and
enhancing theory of mind. Specifically, we present evidence of the
processes by which behavioral synchrony can correct for common
inaccuracies in mental state reasoning by motivating directed
reflexive mental state reasoning, and decreasing the egocentrism
that would otherwise inhibit more explicit reasoning about others’
mental worlds.
Music and Behavioral Synchrony
A recent study suggests that merely coordinating your actions
with a complete stranger through participation in a musical game
is sufficient to induce an empathic pain response of the same
magnitude of that among very close friends (Martin et al., 2015).
We argue that this choice of task, joint music making, is of
special interest as it incorporates elements of synchronous action
that are particularly capable of fostering theory of mind. The
success of this intervention is particularly noteworthy considering
the reported difficulties in enhancing theory of mind through
explicit instruction. Specifically, studies that examine practicing
and learning how to infer and engage with the minds of others
in both typically developing and clinical samples (Ozonoff and
Miller, 1995; Goldstein and Winner, 2012) remain inconclusive.
Indeed, the difficulty in “teaching” theory of mind follows from
the lack of a clearly defined relationship between experiential
input (e.g., learning about mental states through parent–child
discourse; Sabbagh and Callanan, 1998; Farrant et al., 2011) and
cognitive scaffolding (e.g., executive function; Benson et al., 2013)
in the ontogeny of a theory of mind. In contrast to explicit
instruction, behavioral synchronymay offer unique opportunities
to foster accurate mental state reasoning.
The production of music through coordinated rhythmic
movement is a complex multimodal integration problem that
humans are particularly capable of solving; we have got a
knack for synchronizing our behavior with others and with
signals in our environments (Overy and Molnar-Szakacs, 2009;
Konvalinka et al., 2010). Establishing this synchrony, through
spatiotemporal coordination to an external stimuli, is in and of
itself a complicated dynamic task (Phillips-Silver et al., 2010).
Yet, children within their first few years of life develop the
ability to synchronize with others (Feldman, 2007; Kirschner
and Tomasello, 2009). Early experiences of socially contingent,
imitative, and synchronous behaviors help define the boundaries
between self and other, while simultaneously allowing for effective
navigation of those boundaries in fostering efficient interpersonal
coordination (Nadel et al., 2005).
Across the lifespan, the ease with which we synchronize with
others helps solve even the most mundane of joint coordination
problems. Consider the complexity of the seemingly simple
task of two separate minds and bodies figuring out how to lift
and transport a heavy object. This requires those individual
minds and bodies to perceive and react to each other, their
respective movements and the constraints of the external world
(Allport, 1924). Thus, sensory-motor coordination deficits can be
particularly problematic in everyday life. Interestingly, movement
abnormalities and deficits in spatiotemporal coordination are
some of the earliest known precursors to diagnoses along the
autism spectrum (Williams et al., 2001; Grossberg and Seidman,
2006) and are correlated to later deficits in empathic ability (Piek
and Dyck, 2004). This connection between synchronous action
and shared mental experiences—from keeping together in time,
to keeping together in mind—is one that we are only recently
beginning to understand.
Music and dance are the quintessential forms of coordinated
human synchronous behavior. Ehrenreich (2006) and McNeill
(1995) highlight the ubiquity of music, dance and drill in various
forms of collective ritual throughout the anthropological and
historical records while stressing the peculiar power behavioral
synchrony has in both the management and rallying of large
groups of physical bodies and, most strikingly, their mental states.
In their now foundational studies, Wiltermuth and Heath (2009)
empirically tested the core hypothesis laid out by Ehrenreich
(2006) and McNeill (1995) that behavioral synchrony promotes
cooperation. In a standard public goods game, groups that moved
and/or sang synchronously, out-cooperated groups who did so
asynchronously or did nothing at all by consistently contributing
higher amounts to a shared account, from which all participants
take an equal share. Synchrony fostered increased commitment
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to the group, and promoted greater feelings of liking, similarity
and trust. Importantly, this heightened sense of group identity
did not emerge when participants completed the very same task
in an asynchronous manner—pointing to the effectiveness and
specificity of behavioral synchrony in cultivating social cohesion
above and beyond the effects of simply being part of a group.
Indeed, such findings point to synchrony detection as one of
the possible mechanisms responsible for establishing intergroup
boundaries and for creating intergroup bias, speaking to its broad
influence on social cognitive processing.
Attesting to the robustness of the effect of synchrony on
cooperative behaviors, this result has since been replicated in
more naturalistic settings (Cohen et al., 2010), and amongst
diverse cultural groups (Cohen et al., 2013; Fischer et al.,
2013). Further, the reported sensitivity to synchrony amongst
conspecifics in promoting prosocial behaviors develops early
(Kirschner and Tomasello, 2010) and emerges in infants as
young as 14 months (Cirelli et al., 2014a). These converging
lines of research provide strikingly clear evidence of how
culturally evolved collective ritual practices around the world
have galvanized this reliably developing cognitive connection
between synchronous action and sociality.
However, there remains little consensus in this rapidly
growing literature about the precise mechanisms by which these
effects occur. Here, we put forth the hypotheses that in the
process of fostering social cohesion and cooperation, behavioral
synchrony enhances our capacities for theory of mind through
two interrelated processes: (1) readying our minds for reflexive
reasoning about mental states and (2) decreasing the egocentric
biases that impede our accuracy in doing so. Of particular
interest here, is not that synchrony fosters cooperation—but how
it does so. Building from the literature on synchrony, cooperation
and social cohesion, we lay the groundwork for understanding
behavioral synchrony as a means to enhance theory of mind.
Behavioral Synchrony and Reflexive Mental
State Reasoning
Hove and Rise (2009) demonstrated that simply synchronizing
with a visual target on a computer was not sufficient to induce
increased affiliation with physically present others; it is really
all about interpersonal synchrony. This connection between
synchronizing with others and figuring out with whom to
cooperate and affiliate seems to fall out of early developing
inferences about our social worlds. In 14-month-old infants, for
example, synchronous action functions as bothmotivator and cue
for directing later, non-generalized, prosocial behaviors (Cirelli
et al., 2014b). Kirschner and Tomasello (2010) have argued that
in keeping in time with others, synchrony leads pre-school aged
children to hold a representation of others in mind with a specific
focus on the collective intention and shared attention that emerges
from synchronous action. This capacity for sharing attention
and intention emerges early in life and is a critical feature of
the developing child’s theory of mind (Tomasello et al., 2005;
Baillargeon et al., 2010).
In adults, synchronizing with others directs one’s attention
toward those they have synched up with and in the process
increases the likelihood with which they attribute them with
personhood and mind (Macrae et al., 2008). Notably, synchrony
induces greater memory for details of those with whom we
synchronize with, but not greater generalized memory capacity
(Miles et al., 2010). Thus, in the process of turning our
attention toward those we synchronize with while increasing
both the likelihood with which we attribute personhood to those
individuals and hold this representation of the other in mind,
behavioral synchrony engages the cognitive systems that ready our
minds for thinking about the mental states of others.
Furthermore, synching up with others makes us better able
to infer and predict other’s future behaviors, increasing not
only cooperative tendencies, but also the ability to successfully
cooperate. In one study (Valdesolo et al., 2010), participant dyads
were instructed to either rock in or out of synchrony with each
other in chairs, and then worked together in navigating a steel ball
through a wooden labyrinth. Success on this task was determined
by the ease with which participants could infer and predict their
partners’ subtle movements, while dynamically adjusting their
own, without the use of verbal communication, in order to quickly
get the ball through the maze. Synchronous pairs, compared
to asynchronous pairs, were significantly quicker at navigating
the ball through the labyrinth. Further, success on this task was
mediated by a synchrony-induced increase in the ability to detect
subtle differences in temporal movement on an unrelated task.
That is, participants were better able to accurately report whether
a ball on a screen moved at the same or a different pace (which
varied across trials) after passing behind an opaque rectangle;
raising the interesting possibility that moving in synchrony with
others promotes a domain-general increase in ability for tracking
agency—another early developing feature of our core cognitive
capacity for theory of mind (Gergely et al., 1995; Baron-Cohen,
1999; Johnson, 2000).
Collectively, these lines of research provide convergent
evidence for the various ways in which behavioral synchrony
prepares us for engaging with the mental world of others’.
By fostering shared and other-directed attention, individuals
in synchrony become acutely aware of what others’ perceive,
making the jump from what others see to what others think
cognitively easier to compute (Sebanz et al., 2006). Further,
the act of synchronizing, keeping to the beat, in and of itself
dictates not only what others should do, but will do. Thus freeing
up cognitive resources otherwise spent on predicting others’
behaviors, allowing for, as will be described below, more explicit
reasoning about others’ mental worlds.
Behavioral Synchrony, Egocentrism, and
Psychological Distance
In creating a sense of “we” amongst previously unrelated
individuals, behavioral synchrony has been consistently
demonstrated to foster increased liking, feelings of similarity, and
affiliation (Haidt et al., 2008; Hove and Rise, 2009; Wiltermuth
and Heath, 2009; Lakens and Stel, 2011; Valdesolo and DeSteno,
2011). Synchrony actually makes us less able to distinguish
our own faces from those of whom we have synched up with
(Paladino et al., 2010)—blurring the boundaries between self and
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other. In this act of getting over one’s self, behavioral synchrony
may engage and foster explicit mental state reasoning through
a reduction of our egocentric biases that otherwise hinder our
ability to reason about another’s perspective.
Further, psychological distance can inhibit the social cognitive
processes involved in mental state reasoning. The larger the
psychological distance between two individuals or entities (e.g.,
the greater the dissimilarity), the less likely they would believe
they shared any meaningful connections, attitudes, traits, and of
particular interest here, the less likely they would be to attribute
minds to each other (Waytz et al., 2010a). When asked to think
about others who are perceived as psychologically distant (e.g.,
the homeless), individuals dehumanize others and fail to even
recruit the brain networks used in everyday social cognitive
processes (Harris and Fiske, 2006). Further, simply tagging others
as not being in-group members has been demonstrated to be
sufficient for upping the threshold of mind perception—requiring
more humanness (on a doll and human face-morphing task)
before we willingly attribute them with mental states (Hackel
et al., 2014). Interestingly, naturally occurring synchrony in
dyadic interactions occurs significantly less when interacting with
psychologically distant others (Miles et al., 2009). Synchrony then,
when experimentally induced in the lab or experienced through
collective ritual, might aid in decreasing psychological distance
(Vacharkulksemsuk and Fredrickson, 2012), and increase the
likelihood with which we explicitly engage with and reason about
others’ mental worlds.
General Discussion and Future Directions
The act of keeping together in time with others, participation
in synchronous collective ritual, binds individuals into cohesive
groups (McNeill, 1995; Ehrenreich, 2006). This is but one
culturally evolved solution to the problem of sustaining large-
scale cooperation in groups (Henrich and Henrich, 2007). Here,
we argue that synchrony fosters cooperation by exploiting our
everyday social cognitive reasoning about other minds. That
is, by directing attention to others and their mental states,
while decreasing the perceived psychological distance between
individuals, behavioral synchrony makes us better able to reason
about other minds and thus coordinate and cooperate. Behavioral
synchrony then, like the human propensity for imitation, is part
of a larger suite of processes that allow for effective interpersonal
coordination between physical bodies andminds (Chartrand and
Lakin, 2013). The human capacity for interpersonal coordination
and cooperation is remarkable, and known to reliably recruit
neurological systems involved in mental state reasoning (McCabe
et al., 2001; Balslev et al., 2006; Lissek et al., 2008). In turn, the ease
withwhich one reasons about others’mental states has been linked
to the ability to successfully coordinate in joint-action paradigms
(Humphreys and Bedford, 2011; Curry and Chesters, 2012).
The connection between behavioral synchrony and the
cognitive systems we use to engage with others’ mental worlds
underscores the interconnectedness of our behavior- and mind-
reading abilities. Theory of mind is not telepathy—it is a complex
inferential and predictive process that attempts to make sense
of real cues that exist out there in our environments—behaviors
(Whiten, 1996). Following a simulationist perspective on the
mechanisms underlying theory of mind processes (Gallese, 1998;
Frith and Frith, 2006), when we move together in time with
others, understanding their behavior becomes a much simpler
task as the behavior of others is matched in our own, making it
cognitively less demanding and less difficult to reason about their
mental states (Keller et al., 2014).
Research explicitly exploring how behavioral synchrony can
foster theory of mind is sparse. However, there is an emerging
literature examining the benefits of musical group interaction
and dance-movement therapy in enhancing various components
of theory of mind in typically developing and clinical samples
of young children. Both of these applications heavily involve
synchronous interactions with others and are found to increase
social cognitive processes that promote reflexive mental state
reasoning (e.g., joint attention, imitation, gaze following; Landa
et al., 2011), as well as explicit tendencies for empathy and
perspective taking (McGarry, 2011; Behrends et al., 2012;
Rabinowitch et al., 2013).
Thus, the question remains as to how broadly the current
hypotheses can be put into practice. We are currently building an
in-depth research program exploring how behavioral synchrony
can differentially enhance different components of theory of
mind—directly testing the hypotheses that synchrony fosters both
explicit and implicit mind perception, empathy and perspective
taking using a battery of measures built specifically to capture
correlates of theory of mind. With promising results, the
question of what this synchrony-induced mental state reasoning
accomplishes in terms of other processes we know to be related to
theory of mind—such as in the domains of moral reasoning and
cultural learning—remains open for future research. Our hope is
that we have made a case here for the viability of this research
program and inspire future research toward the goal of better
understanding themechanisms underlyingmental state reasoning
in order to foster better social perspective taking.
What emerges from an understanding of the connection
between behavioral synchrony and theory of mind is a
cohesive framework from which to understand the already well-
established effects of synchrony on coordination, cooperation
and cohesion—understanding the process by which joint physical
action leads to joint mental connection. This framework provides
answers to (or at the very least testable hypotheses regarding)
the question of why behavioral synchrony is so ubiquitous in
collective rituals around the world. From army drills to church
choirs, culturally evolved collective rituals involving synchrony
tune our minds for reasoning about other’s mental states. In doing
so, individuals become better able to learn from, coordinate,
cooperate, and empathize with others—shaping human sociality.
Presently, we argue that we can exploit this culturally galvanized
connection between synchrony and mental state reasoning—and
apply synchrony as a tool for fostering theory of mind.
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